

Message Text

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SUBJECT: HIGHLIGHTS: POST-MEETING DISCUSSIONS, SEPTEMBER 5, 1975
(SALT TWO-776)

1. VERIFICATION (ARTICLE XVII.3). SHCHUKIN SPECULATED (TO HENKIN) ON U.S. MOTIVES FOR INTRODUCING THE COMPLEX DEFINITION IT HAD FOR THE AGREED STATEMENT TO ACCOMPANY ARTICLE XVII.3. THE LANGUAGE COULD REQUIRE, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT EACH SIDE NOTIFY THE OTHER WHEN IT WAS GOING TO CONDUCT A TEST. HENKIN WOULD PROBABLY NOT AGREE, BUT IT APPEARED TO SHCHUKIN THAT THE U.S. HAD "SUPPLEMENTARY" MOTIVES. HENKIN POINTED OUT THAT SUCH A VIEW WAS INCONSISTENT WITH THE INCORPORATION OF THE PHRASE "REQUIRED FOR VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS" IN THE PROPOSED AGREED STATEMENT. SHCHUKIN REPLIED THAT THE TWO SIDES MAY NOT AGREE ON WHAT WAS REQUIRED FOR VERIFICATION BY THESE MEANS. THERE WAS NO MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING ON WHAT IS NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT FOR THIS PURPOSE.

2. SHCHUKIN POSED AN EXAMPLE TO MAKE HIS POINT. SUPPOSE THE U.S. WERE TO BEGIN TESTING A NEW ICBM AT VANDENBURG. THERE WERE MANY ACTIVITIES THAT OCCURRED IN PREPARING FOR THE
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LAUNCHING OF THE TEST MISSILE, SOME INVOLVING "RADIO."

OF COURSE TESTING OF A NEW MISSILE MIGHT INVOLVE NEW TYPES OF SUCH ACTIVITIES. UNDER THE U.S. FORMULATION SUCH NEW ACTIVITIES, WHICH CAN PROVIDE "DATA" TO NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, COULD BE INTERPRETED TO BE HIDING SUCH DATA SINCE THEY WOULD NOT EMPLOY WELL-KNOWN PROCEDURES FROM EARLIER TESTS. THE DETAILED PROVISION OF THE U.S. GAVE A "PRETEXT" FOR SAYING ONE SIDE IS HIDING INFORMATION NECESSARY TO VERIFY. HENKIN REPLIED THAT IN THIS EXAMPLE THE U.S. COULD REASONABLY SAY THAT THIS TYPE OF DATA, WHICH WAS PROVIDED IN A STAGE BEFORE THE TESTING OF A NEW MISSILE EVEN OCCURRED, WAS SIMPLY NOT NECESSARY TO VERIFY A DEPLOYMENT LIMITATION. SHCHUKIN ADDED THAT, AS A SPECIALIST, HE WAS CONVINCED THE ABM TREATY WAS MORE DIFFICULT TO VERIFY THAN THE NEW AGREEMENT WOULD BE.

3. A PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION OF THE NEED TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN MIRV'ED AND NON-MIRV'ED MISSELS IN THE TESTING PHASE AND BETWEEN ASBM'S OF OVER 600 KM AND UNDER 600 KM IN THE TESTING PHASE FOLLOWED. SHCHUKIN POINTED OUT THAT THE U.S. CURRENTLY HAD NO PROBLEMS IN DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN MIRV'ED AND NON-MIRV'ED SOVIED MISSILES. HENKIN REPLIED THAT THE U.S. WISHED TO MAINTAIN THAT DESIRABLE STATE OF AFFAIRS. SHCHUKIN ASKED "APPROPOS OF THE U.S. TEXT" WHAT THE U.S. "WISHES TO SEE" IN THE TESTING OF MIRV'ED MISSILES. HENKIN REPLIED "WHATEVER IT IS NECESSARY TO SEE." WOULD SHCHUKIN AGREE THAT THE TESTING OF 1000 KM RANGE ASBM'S SO AS TO MAKE THEM APPEAR TO BE 500 KM ASBM'S WOULD BE PROHIBITED; SHCHUKIN AGREED, BUT ADDED THAT THE INCLUSION OF TESTING IN THE AGREED STATEMENT WAS "DANGEROUS TO BOTH SIDES" BECAUSE THERE "WOULD BE OTHER CASES THAN THE TESTING OF ASBM'S" TO WHICH IT COULD BE APPLIED.

4. SHCHUKIN ASKED TO SEE THE TEXT OF THE PROPOSED U.S. STATEMENT. HE UNDERLINED "ANY DATA" WHERE IT OCCURRED. ASATIANI, WHO WAS TRANSLATING SHCHUKIN'S RUSSIAN INTO ENGLISH, SAID THAT THIS TERM WAS "UNACCEPTABLE." HE ADDED THAT WAS HIS WORD, NOT SHCHUKIN'S. HENKIN ASKED FOR THE WORD SHCHUKIN HAD USED, AND SHCHUKIN SAID "TRES DIFFICILE." HE WENT ON TO UNDERLINE "INCLUDING TEST AND DEVELOPMENT DATA." HENKIN ASKED IF THE LATTER DIFFICULTY WAS DUE TO THE USE OF THE TERM "ANY DATA" EARLIER IN THE SENTENCE OF THE PROPOSED AGREED STATEMENT. SHCHUKIN REPLIED THAT THE DIFFICULTY

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WAS DUE TO THE USE OF "ANY DATA WHICH THE OTHER SIDE THINKS IS NECESSARY." HENKIN ASKED IF THERE WAS AS MUCH DIFFICULTY WITH "ANY MEASURE" IN THE U.S. PROPOSED PARAGRAPH 3? SHCHUKIN RETREATED FROM DISCUSSIONS OF THE TEXT AT THIS POINT. JOHNSON

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